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Commercial Leasing: Implied Covenants
of Operation in Shopping Center Leases
I.

Introduction

Leases play an integral part in the operation of a shopping
center.1 Shopping center landlords are generally interested in maintaining the business in which their tenants are involved. At times,
however, there are some tenants who for one reason or another have
decided not to use the leased premises. A tenant's failure to use and
occupy a retail store front in a shopping center will have a detrimental effect on the economic strength of the entire center.' The parties
to a lease often fail to express properly the tenant's duty to occupy
the premises, and courts are sometimes unwilling to imply covenants
to operate.$ In a recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decision, Slater
v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc.," the court used the doctrine of necessary implication to imply a covenant of use and occupancy.0 Slater
represents the Pennsylvania courts' acceptance of implied covenants
to operate, and the Slater holding provides a better means for effectuating the intentions of the parties to a lease.
This Comment examines the effect that an implied covenant to
operate has on the operation of a shopping center. The economic factors that could lead to the failure of a commercial business to occupy
and use leased premises are an important aspect of this analysis. The
effect that discontinuing operations has on the economic interests of
the center is also examined.
This Comment begins with a discussion of the traditional approach to the handling of covenants to operate. The analysis focuses
on the nature of sole use clauses' and the importance courts have
placed on the interrelationship of economic units within a center.
The focus then shifts to the terms of the lease and the effect of difI. See J. MCKEEVER, N. GRIFFIN & F. SPINK, JR., SHOPPING CENTER DEVELOPMENT
HANDBOOK, 131-39 (1977) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]; Faletti, Financing the Shopping Center,
1965 U. ILL. L.F. 151 (1965); Goldberg, Reviewing Leasesfor a Small Shopping Center, N.Y.
ST. B.J. July 1975, at 28. See also Roswick & McEvily, Use Clauses in Shopping Center
Leases: The Effect of the Tenant's Bankruptcy, 14 REAL EST. L.J. 3 (1985).

2. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit Man, 377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580 (1954);
Walgreen Arizona Drug v. Plaza Center Corp., 132 Ariz. 512, 647 P.2d 643 (1982).
4. 376 Pa. Super. 580, 546 A.2d 676 (1988).
5. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
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fering terms on the implied covenant to operate. The discussion emphasizes the importance of a percentage based rental.7 This Comment also assesses the proper use of contract principles in the
implication of any covenant. 8
The remainder of the Comment examines the doctrine of necessary implication" as used by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Slater. This Comment concludes with a discussion of the possible
remedies that a commercial landlord might seek to deal with a nonoccupying retail tenant.
II. Economic Background
A.

The Need for Landlord Protection

There are several economic or business considerations that lead
a tenant to cease operating his business. For example, a tenant who
is in a strong business position may find the landlord's facilities to be
outdated or inadequate. 10 On the other hand, a tenant who is economically distressed may find it more economical to pay the minimum rent and save on the cost of maintaining a staff and inventory." A conflict arises, however, when the lessor fails to express the
tenant's duty to operate. 2
If the lease does not have an express provision to occupy, the
lessee is under no duty to occupy or use the leased premises.' 3 The
lessee is not required to take possession of the premises, and may
vacate even after having been in possession.' 4 The landlord does not
have the right to enter the premises or to retake possession solely due
to the tenant's failure to use the premises. 15 The tenant will be able
to recover possession. 16 If, however, a court finds an implied covenant to operate in a lease that does not contain an express provision
to occupy, the landlord may be able to recover possession of the un7. See infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 109-34 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 135-60 and accompanying text.
10. I M. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES, § 6.9 (1974).
11. Id. See also P. ROHAN, 7A CURRENT LEASING LAW AND TECHNIQUES, § 11.01 [3] n.
6 (1988) (discussing the manner in which an anchor tenant cuts losses by ceasing operations).
12. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10.
13. Goldberg v. Pearl, 306 Ill. 436, 138 N.E. 141 (1923); Moore v. Guardian Trust Co.,
173 Mo. 218, 73 S.W. 143 (1903); Dougan v. H.J. Grell Co., 174 Wis. 17, 182 N.W. 350

(1921).
14. Goldberg v. Pearl, 306 II1.436, 138 N.E. 141 (1923); Moore v. Guardian Trust Co.,
173 Mo. 218, 73 S.W. 143 (1903); Dougan v. H.J. Grell Co., 174 Wis. 17, 182 N.W. 350
(1921). See also Kimble v. Willey, 198 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1952).

15. Chancey v. Smith, 25 W. Va. 404 (1885).
16.

Id.
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occupied premises.
B.

The Importance of Tenant Mix

The development and operation of a shopping center is dependent upon and directly related to the leasing scheme of the stores in
the center.18 Tenant selection and leasing will be affected by the financing" and the tenant mix 20 desired by the landlord. The importance of tenant mix to the success of a center has caused increased
attention to be placed on tenant selection.2 1
17. See infra notes 166-90 and accompanying text.
18. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 131-39; Goldberg, supra note I, at 47.
19. Faletti, supra note 1, at 162:
The mortgage lender considers the value of the land and buildings based on its
physical appraisal, as well as the economic value of the shopping center as a
going (or hopefully going) concern . . . . A primary concern of the mortgage
lender is the amount of shopping center income which will be generated from
fixed minimum rents paid by tenants with AAA-1 credit rating. While a tenant
usually must be part of a chainstore retail operation on a national scale in order
to enjoy that kind of credit rating, regional chain operations, as well as local
tenants with strong financial statements, are also usually acceptable.
20. See Roswick & McEvily, supra note 1, at 6-7: "A shopping center works because
everyone involved understands that the commercial success of the enterprise 'depends on the
finished product functioning as a unit, presenting to the public a single face.'" Id.
What makes this type of operation desirable is the fact that experience has
shown that a combination of tenants ("tenant mix") that is well designed to
serve the "trade area" of a shopping center will have a symbiotic effect on business in the center that will benefit all of the tenants. It is for this reason that
businesses are willing to pay a premium to directly compete with each other in
close proximity in the shopping center. (Footnote omitted)
Id. (quoting, ULI, DOLLARS AND CENTS OF SHOPPING CENTERS, 4 (1981)).
The shopping center industry has always contended that tenant mix is vital to the success
of any project. It is the main distinction between a shopping center and a downtown shopping
area. In a central business district, tenants are not usually chosen in accordance with a welldeveloped master plan. A shopping center, however,
[i]f successful, is the product of considerable sophisticated planning and consists
of a delicate balance of merchants. Tenants are chosen on the basis of their
business use, their type of operation, the market they will cater to (age grouping,
financial status, etc.), financial viability, and business experience. The choosing
of types of tenants, takes into consideration the needs of the surrounding community and the appeal of the stores, as a whole, to a broad segment of the population. A well-planned project will have a percentage of ready-to-wear
merchants, shoe stores, food establishments, gift shops, book stores, service establishments, etc. A center so planned is protective of the tenants, the landlord,
as well as satisfying the needs of the community to which it usually contributes
considerable tax dollars . . . . This is true not only for large shopping centers,
but also for small centers where independent merchants depend upon one another to attract customers from whom they mutually benefit. (footnote omitted)
(quoting Eagle, Shopping Center Control; The Developer Besieged, J. URBAN LAw 585-99
(1974)).
21. See id. The author states:
Tenant mix is essential to the success of all shopping centers, regardless of
their size. It has become even more important as the number of centers has
increased. The importance of tenant mix has been recognized and discussed by
specialists in shopping center development. In the course of one such discussion,
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The landlord or developer of a well-planned center will plan out
the composition of the center to achieve an economically strong tenant mix. 2 The center's mix will depend upon the classification of the
center.2" Centers of differing size and function depend upon different
types of stores as key tenants.2 For example, a neighborhood center
a retailer noted that developers have become more professional in their approach
to building small centers, applying lessons learned in the development of malls to
small center development.
[l]n the past . . . many people thought that they could just go out and
develop a shopping center. Many of them had money, bought a piece of property
somewhere, built a shopping center without any regard to the neighborhood, or
of the desirability or the need for the center. These projects became nothing
more than useless eyesores. The tenant mix quite often was bad because the only
thing -they were looking for was rent dollars. They don't have the first idea what
tenant mix is. They would just as soon put in a dentist or a real estate office as a
retail tenant. (footnote omitted)
Roswick & McEvily, supra note 1, at 6-7 (quoting ICSC, TENANT MIX FOR SMALL SHOPPING
CENTERS,

8 (1979)).

22.
at 4-5:

See HANDBOOK, supra note I at 67-85, see also Roswick & McEvily, supra note I,

Tenants are not randomly chosen for location in a shopping center. They
are selected according to a plan. The careful selection of the type of tenants and
their location in a shopping center, the tenant mix, is essential to the creation
and preservation of a successful shopping center. The mix is established through
a series of clauses in each tenant's lease. These clauses, called restrictive clauses,
describe how the leased premises may and may not be used. Some clauses will
give a tenant the exclusive right to sell certain items. Other clauses may prohibit
a tenant from selling named merchandise or using the premises for any purpose
other than that named in the provision. Taken together, the leases fulfill a plan
to create a certain type of shopping center which caters to the needs of the
surrounding community.
A center's classification depends upon the services and functions it will provide. Roswick &
McEvily, supra note 1, at 6-7.
23. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 3-7.
24. Id. The chart in the handbook that describes the type of center, lead store, square
feet, site size, and minimum population support required is particularly informative. Id. at 7.
The following is a summary of the types of centers and their key tenants:
In neighborhood centers, the supermarket is the key. The drugstore is
equally necessary. Personal services and convenience goods normally comprise
the balance of the tenantry.
In community centers, the variety store, the junior department store, and
the popular price (low margin) or discount store make up the anchor classifications. Supplementary tenants include those of the neighborhood center, with
added shopping goods representation, particularly of the apparel and home furnishings categories.
In regional centers, at least one full-line department store of 100,000 square
feet GLA is essential. A majority of regional centers include two or more such
department stores. For the supplementary tenant roster, all tenant classifications
are drawn upon. Representation by several stores of the same category is customary, allowing the final tenant composition to represent as closely as possible
the ranges in price and merchandise once found only in downtowns.
In super-regional centers, three or more full-line department stores and a
total center GLA of at least 750,000 square feet are required by definition for
this type of center.
In specialty centers, a key tenant of the traditional categories need not be
present. The grouping of tenants is determined by the special nature of the trade
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would have a supermarket as a key tenant, whereas a regional center

would have one or more full-service department stores as a key tenants2 5 Each center selects its tenants according to its individual
needs, which are based on varying conditions." The developer, however, is interested in selecting stores that will complement each
other's business. 7
An individual tenant's rent is partially based on the potential
customers that the tenant's business will draw to the center.28 A nonoperating rental unit in a center represents more than merely a loss
of rental incomes:
Clearly, a business that has ceased to operate, or a building that
serves only as a warehouse or lies otherwise empty and unproductive, represents not only a loss of sales, which is the basis of
percentage rent, but also the loss of pulling power upon which
each of the other tenants of the shopping center relies.29
area or according to the tenants' suitability to a unique structure, such as a
rehabilitated historic structure.
A wide range in gross leasable area may be expected for specialty centers;
between 40,000 and 300,000 square feet GLA may be feasible. A variety of
tenants - boutiques, import shops, high fashion or specialty apparel shops, arts
and crafts stores, hobby shops or other specialty stores, food stores, and food
service outlets - may be considered for their suitability to the character, quality, and drawing power of the location.
Any specialty center, whether located in a new structure or in a landmark
structure or other building newly converted for retail use, must have at least one
prime or anchor tenant. Such a key tenant could be either a specialty retail store
or a restaurant.
In mini-malls (a variation of the community shopping center), a junior department store or supermarket performs the function of anchor tenant. Minimalls are enclosed and weather-conditioned and have between 80,000 and
150,000 square feet of GLA.
Id. at 69.
25. Id.
26. HANDBOOK, supra note 1,at 72.
27. Id.
Seasoned leasing brokers, appraisers, landlords, and shopping center operators
have learned many things about grouping certain kinds of businesses:
Men's stores - shoes, clothing and haberdashery, sporting goods - tend
to swell each other's volume.
Similarly, women's apparel, shoes and millinery and children's clothes
and toys - the soft lines prosper in proximity to one another.
Food products do well when grouped together - groceries, meat and fish
markets, delicatessens, bakeries, doughnut shops, and confectioners.
Stores which sell personal services and conveniences naturally go together, but in shopping centers they should be as close as possible to the
parking area.
Id. at 72. Enclosed centers also present the problem of selecting tenants that have sufficient
customer-traffic draw, which will benefit the other tenants and, in turn, the developer. Id. at
77-78.
28. Id. at 78.
29. Note, Specific Performance of Shopping Center Leases in California, 21 HASTINGS
L. 532, 535 (footnote omitted) (1970).
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The Importance of the Tenant to the Lessor's Financing

To make financing decisions, the mortgagee will look to the
composition of the center's tenants and to the provisions of the leases
involved.3 0 The developer or landlord must satisfy the requirements
set forth by the lender to acquire necessary financing. The lender's
decision will depend upon factors such as the number of triple A-1
credit-rated tenants.3 ' The lender will also look at the tenants' base
rents to see if they cover the expense, including the landlord's debt
costs.32 Large national chains are most able to obtain a triple A-1
credit rating. 3 The tenants with triple A-1 ratings are generally in

strong bargaining positions with relation to the landlord, and these
tenants are usually able to negotiate very favorable lease terms.3,
The lender should be aware of this and avoid providing financing to
landlords who have entered into leases that unduly favor tenants.3 "
A clause in the tenants' leases may relieve tenants of their obli-

gation to operate if one of the tenants fails to operate. 8 Such a
clause will appear in a lease because tenants as well as landlords
understand that each tenant's success is in part based on the success
of other tenants. These clauses are usually tied to a key tenant's fail37
ure to operate.
30. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 63, P. ROHAN, supra note 5, at § 11.01 [3].
31. A credit rating generally refers to a valuation that is given to a business by a mercantile association or credit bureau, such as Dun & Bradstreet. A triple A-I, or AAA-I, credit
rating is generally the highest rating a business can receive. See generally HANDBOOK, supra
note 1, at 63, 131-39; Faletti, supra note 1, at 162.
32. Faletti, supra note 1, at 154-62. This article provides an excellent summary of the
financing alternatives available to the shopping center 'developer. The ability of revenues from
triple A-I rated tenant leases to cover operating expenses and fixed costs is important regardless of the financing arrangement. See id.
33. Id. at 162. "This may explain all those chain operated shoe stores found in many
shopping centers." Id. at 162 n.12.
34. HANDBOOK, supra note I, at 63. See also P. ROHAN, supra note 5, at § 11.0113]
(discussing demands of a key tenant). Compare, P. ROHAN, supra note 5, at § 11.06121, Form
11.2 (key tenant lease) with § 11.06[1], Form 11.1 (satellite tenant lease).
35. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 63. See also id. at 77 (discussing trend away from
triple A-I rated tenants, and toward strong regional operators); Faletti, supra note 1, at 16470 (discussing the concerns of a mortgagee in regard to the terms of a center's leases). Although the landlord generally bases his leasing decisions upon the requirements of the financing provider, he also takes other factors into account. See Faletti, supra note 1, at 162.
36. See P. ROHAN, supra note 11, at § 11.01 [3], n.6 (discussing bargaining of satellite
tenants for clauses relieving them of their duty to operate on a key tenant's failure to operate).
37. Id. A Sample lease clause reads as follows:
Tenant Reciprocal Covenants
(C) In consideration of the representations and covenants set forth in Paragraph
B of this Article, and so long as the [Key Tenant] Operating Covenant shall be
in force and not breached by the tenant under the [Key Tenant] Lease, Tenant
agrees (i) on or before . . . subject to the provisions of Article 27 to open for
business to the public in the Demised Premises as a [Named] department store,
(ii) for a period of at least the first '. . . Lease Years of the Initial Term, Ten-

SHOPPING CENTER LEASES

Since many parties are affected by the shopping center lease, it
is a document that requires special attention. If, however, economic
problems arise and the applicable lease does not provide a solution,
the courts will have to address the problems. In rendering a decision,
the court should carry out the intentions of the parties to the lease.
In addition, the court should consider the relationship between the
parties involved and the parties intent expressed in the lease.
D.

Development of Judicial Remedies

In Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 8 a recent Pennsylvania
Superior Court decision, the court found an implied "use and occupancy clause" in a commercial shopping mall lease."a The tenant,
Pearle Vision, paid rent but never occupied the premises.' 0 Plaintiff,
the owner of the strip shopping center, filed a suit in equity that
sought "an injunction to require Pearle to occupy and use the
premises.""'
The trial court held that the lease contained no express obligation to occupy and that under Pennsylvania common law none could
be implied.' The court interpreted the holdings of Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit Man Corp.' a and McKnight-Seibert Shopping Center,
Inc. v. National Tea Co." to prohibit implying a use and occupancy
clause in a lease. 5 On appeal, the superior court reversed the trial
ant, or its parent, subsidiary or affiliated corporations, or their successors, (hereinafter called Related Companies) agree to operate a department store business
in the Demised Premises under the name of ... or such other name as may

from time to time be common to the majority of the department stores operated
by Tenant or its Related Companies in the ... area, and (iii) that for a period
encompassing at least the next ensuing ... Lease Years of the Initial Term the
Demised Premises shall be operated as a department store (but not necessarily
owned or operated by Tenant or its Related Companies). From and after the
• . .Lease Year and throughout the remainder of the term of this Lease the
Demised Premises may be used for the operation of a department store or for
the conduct of any other lawful retail business, except that after the expiration
of the twentieth Lease Year of the Initial Term, Tenant shall not be obligated to
use or conduct, or to remain open for the conduct of, any business in the Demised Premises.
Id. at § 11.06(2][c].
38. 376 Pa. Super. 580, 546 A.2d 676 (1988).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 581, 546 A.2d at 677.
41. Id. at 581-82, 546 A.2d at 677.
42. Id. at 582, 546 A.2d at 677 (Slater, looking to the lower court's recognition of and
reliance upon Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit Man Corp., 377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580 (1954) and
McKnight-Seibert Shopping Center, Inc. v. National Tea Co., 263 Pa. Super. 292, 397 A.2d
1214 (1979) to deny the possibility of an implied obligation to use and occupy).
43. 377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580 (1954).
44. 263 Pa. Super. 292, 397 A.2d 1214 (1979).
45. Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 76 Pa. Super. 580, 582, 546 A.2d 676, 677
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court's decision.4" The court distinguished the facts of Dickey and
McKnight from the facts of Slater 7and found that the holdings in
those cases did not apply to Slater.4
The Slater court's decision to imply an occupancy clause in the
lease was based on contract principles." The superior court applied

the doctrine of necessary implication," which provides:
In the absence of an express provision, the law will imply an
agreement by the parties to a contract to do and perform those
things that according to reason and justice they should do in
order to carry out the purpose for which the contract was made
and to refrain from doing anything that would destroy or injure
the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract."0
This doctrine requires only that the implied promise be within the
parties' contemplation.51 There is no requirement that the lease be
ambiguous.52
Since the doctrine of necessary implication serves not to instruct
the court as to which of two possible interpretations of a contract should be adopted, but rather to allow the court to enforce
the clear intentions of the parties and avoid injustice, the court
does not need to find an ambiguity before it will employ the
doctrine. 58
To apply the doctrine of necessary implication, the Slater court
focused on three clauses in the lease: (1) the tenant must be open
within 90 days; (2) the tenant must conduct business on the entire
premises; and (3) the tenant is required to keep the premises consistent with the shopping center.5" The court noted that if the lease had
been silent on Pearle's obligation to use and occupy the premises, the
court would not have implied the use and occupancy clause. 55 The
(1988).
46. Id. at 582, 546 A.2d at 677.
47. Id. at 583-86, 546 A.2d at 678-79.
48. Id. at 585-88, 546 A.2d at 679-80. Pennsylvania law has long held that "a lease is in
the nature of a contract and is controlled by principles of contract law." Id. at 586, 546 A.2d
at 679 (quoting Cimina v. Bronich, 517 Pa. 378, 383, 537 A.2d 1355, 1357 (1988)).
49. Slater, 376 Pa. Super. at 586, 546 A.2d at 679 (quoting Frickert v. Dieter Bros.
Fuel Co., 464 Pa. 596, 347 A.2d 701 (1975) (Pomeroy, J., concurring)).
50. Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 376 Pa. Super. 580, 586, 546 A.2d 676, 697
(1988) (quoting Frickert v. Deiter Bros. Fuel Co., 464 Pa. 596, 347 A.2d 701 (1975) (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
51.

Slater, 376 Pa. Super. 586-87, 546 A.2d at 679.

52. Id. at 587, 546 A.2d at 679.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 587-88, 546 A.2d at 679-80.
55. Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 376 Pa. Super. 580, 589, 546 A.2d 767, 681
(1988).
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court supported its decision by citing a similar decision by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Ingannamorte v. King's Super Markets.5"
Slater represents both an excellent explanation and an important expansion of commercial leasing law in Pennsylvania. The position taken by the superior court expands the application of contract
law in the interpretation of leases. 57 Judicial recognition of implied
covenants that were within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of contract formation can facilitate the continued successful operation of the shopping center.
III.

Methods Used to Imply a Covenant of Use and Occupancy

An implied covenant to operate can arise in a number of ways.
A requirement of use and occupancy could be implied from a sole
use clause" in the lease. The surrounding situation and the interdependence of economic units involved in the operation of the center
may suggest to a court that a use and occupancy clause exists. A
percentage rental may be involved. Traditional contract rules of interpretation may require that a court imply a use and occupancy
clause.
A.

Sole Use Clauses

Courts construe a lease clause stating that "tenant will use
leased premises for the purpose of . .. " as allowing the prescribed
use but not requiring it.5 9 A court would be more likely to imply a
covenant to operate if the lease contains a detailed clause that sets
forth the tenant's duty to occupy and use the premises. 60 This has
56.
57.
58.
purpose.

55 N.J. 223, 260 A.2d 841 (1970).
See infra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
Sole use clauses are clauses prescribing that a lease premise be used for a specified
See infra notes 61, 66 and accompanying text.

59. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at § 6.904.
60. Language that is effective for such a clause is found in Dover Shopping Center, Inc.
v. Cushman's Sons, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 384, 387-88, 164 A.2d 785, 787-88 (1960):
Third: As one of the inducements for the making of this lease, Tenant
hereby agrees, beginning as soon after the commencement of the term as is reasonably possible and continuing during the full remaining term of this lease, to
operate its business in the demised premises; to keep its store open daily for the
regular conduct of its business therein during the same hours at least as are
customarily employed by other similar stores in the neighborhood of the demised
premises, and to keep and maintain the show window displays in an attractive
and dignified manner: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that Tenant shall be under no
duty to keep said store open on Sundays or holidays, or on days when it is customary for other stores in Dover, New Jersey, to keep closed. Tenant hereby
agrees to join with the other tenants in the shopping center in any endeavor to
formulate a common plan of store hours and business days; and if Tenant and
said other tenants shall arrange such common plan, then the store hours and
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been the traditional interpretation of sole use clauses. 1 The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit Man
Corp., 2 expressed the reasoning behind such an interpretation.
Dickey involved the lease of a property for the operation of a
car washing and cleaning business. 8 The lease required that the
lessee use the premises "in the business of washing and cleaning automobiles within the scope of the business of the Philadelphia Minit
Man Corporation . . . and for no other purpose.16 4 The lease provided for a percentage rental as well as a minimum yearly rental."
The court found that
a provision in a lease that the premises are to be used only for a
certain prescribed purpose imports no obligation on the part of
the lessee to use or continue to use the premises for that purpose; such a provision is a66 covenant against a nonconforming
use, not a covenant to use.
The defendant in Dickey argued that the court should not imply
a covenant because the lease provided for a substantial minimum
rental.67 The court agreed that the substantial minimum rental was
an important factor in deciding whether to imply a covenant to operate." The plaintiff argued that the lease implied a covenant and
therefore the defendant was required "to continue the business on
the premises to the fullest extent possible."6 9 The court's response to
this argument reflected the problem of implied covenants to operate
that are recognized to maximize rentals:
business days of Tenant's store on the demised premises, in lieu of the store
hours and business days hereinabove set forth in this Article, shall be those prescribed by said common plan during the continuance thereof. It is further agreed
that no failure by Tenant to keep said store open for business by reason of the
elements, fire, labor disturbances or other causes beyond the control of Tenant
shall be deemed a breach by Tenant of the terms of this Article.

61. Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955); Cousins
Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 113 P.2d 878 (1941); Selber Bros. v.
Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 203 La. 316, 14 So. 2d 10 (1940); Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit Man
Corp. 377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580 (1954); Tulip Realty Co. v. City Products Corp., Pa. D. &
C.2d 629 (Philadelphia Co. 1961). See also cases collected in 38 A.L.R. 1117 (1925) and 40
A.L.R. 3d 981 § 5[b] (1971). But see Edlin Co. v. Nashville Mgt., 680 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1984)
(holding that a covenant requiring use as a restaurant was restrictive and that use as a tavern
and cabaret was not satisfactory).
62. 377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580 (1954).
63. Id. at 551, 105 A.2d at 580.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 552, 105 A.2d at 581.
67. Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit Man Corp., 377 Pa. 549, 552, 105 A.2d 580, 581
(1954) (importance of a minimum rental is discussed in section IlIA of this Comment).
68. Id. at 552-56, 105 A.2d at 581-83.
69. Id. at 552, 105 A.2d at 581.
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If an implied covenant, as claimed by the plaintiff, should be
held to arise in such cases, what would be the extent of the restriction thereby imposed upon the lessee? Would it extend to
each and every act on his part that might serve to reduce the
extent of his business and thereby the percentage rental based
thereon? Would it forbid him, for example, if operating a retail
store, from keeping it open for a fewer number of hours each
day than formerly? Would it forbid him from dismissing salesmen whereby his business might be reduced in volume? Would
it forbid him from discontinuing any department of his business
even though he found it to be operating at a loss? It would obviously be quite unreasonable and wholly undesirable to imply an
obligation that would necessarily be vague, uncertain and generally impracticable."0
The court found that the tenant in Dickey acted in good faith
when he changed his business operation. 7 1 The court cited and distinguished various decisions that involved acts by the lessee designed
to avoid or reduce percentage rental payments.7 ' Affirmative actions
that result in a reduction in percentage rent are permissible if these
acts are performed in good faith."
B.

Interdependence of Economic Units Test

A shopping center is a unique entity that may require special
consideration by the court. The interdependence of the interests in a
shopping center may be important to the interpretion of the applicable lease . 7 The Slater court considered the interdependence of economic units to be support for its decision. 5
The importance of the interdependence of economic units was
the rationale employed by a New Jersey case, Ingannamorte v.
70. Id. at 554, 105 A.2d at 582.
71. Id. at 556, 105 A.2d at 583.
72. See Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit Man Corp., 377 Pa. 549, 544-46, 105 A.2d 580,
582-83 (cases distinguished). See also Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, 8111.2d 571, 571-72,
134 N.E.2d 806, 807 (1956) (defendant rented horse racing track and then proceeded to cease
operations and held races elsewhere).
73. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Blumberg, 234 Md. 521, 200 A.2d 166 (1964) (finding that
the defendants, supermarket owners involved in a highly competitive business, fulfilled covenant to maximize volume at the store leased from plaintiff. Apparently defendants had opened
other stores to compete better, but as a result, reduced the volume of sales at each individual
store).
74. In deciding to enter a business situation in a shopping mall, both the landlord and
the tenant consider at least some of the advantages of the conglomeration of businesses. Therefore, it could be argued that a consideration of the interdependent economic units is important.
75. See Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 376 Pa. Super. 580, 588, 546 A.2d 676, 680
(1988) See text accompanying note 90.
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King's Super Markets.7 6 It is noteworthy that a companion case,

Tooley's Truck Stop, Inc. v. Chrisanthopouls,7 reaffirmed the position set forth by Ingannamorte.7 In Ingannamorte, the court addresed the issue of a vacant supermarket that occupied one-third of a
small shopping center.79 The lessee had closed its doors and removed
the exterior sign, but left its equipment on the premises and continued to pay the monthly rent.80 In a suit instituted by the lessor, the

lower court found the occupancy clause in the lease to be both "restrictive and mandatory."8 1 The New Jersey Supreme Court found
the provisions of the lease and the surrounding circumstances sufficient to imply a covenant to operate.8 2 The court distinguished other

New Jersey cases on the basis of the language in the leases. In addition, the court believed that these cases "did not involve a situation
where, as here, there were interdependent economic units and the

landlord had an obvious interest in the continued active operation of
the leased premises far beyond the mere payment of the fixed
monthly rental." 8 3
In Tooley's Truck Stop, Inc. v. Chrisanthopouls,84 the compan-

ion case to the Ingannamorte case, the lease at issue applied to a
diner at a truck stop.85 The diner originally operated on a twenty-

four hour basis. The lessee gradually reduced the hours and eventu76. 55 N.J. 223, 260 A.2d 841 (1970).
77. 55 N.J. 231, 260 A.2d 845 (1970).
78. Slater cites Ingannamorte as support for the position adopted by the court. The
theory, however, was recited in two cases decided by the same judge on the same day, and may
be a mere aberration of the law based upon that judge's preferences.
79. Ingannamorte, 55 N.J. at 224, 260 A.2d at 841 ("[defendant was leasing] a supermarket, which occupies about one-third of the total floor space in the center, and eleven satellite retail stores, including inter alia, a drugstore, a beauty salon, a delicatessen, a bakery, a
confectionery and stationery store, a hardware store, a dry goods store, a children's clothing
store, and a laundromat").
80. Id. at 225, 260 A.2d at 842. The store premises, which the lessee had once occupied
and used in the operation of a supermarket, were now being used as a warehouse for equipment the lessee had used in its operation.
81. Ingannamorte v. King's Supermarkets, 55 N.J. 223, 226-27, 260 A.2d 841, 842
(1970). "Both restrictive and mandatory" means that the clause will prohibit uses not allowed,
and will require the use of the premises as a supermarket. The lease here contained the following clause: "to be used and occupied only for a supermarket for the sale of all kinds of food
groceries, vegetables and refreshments, expressly excluding the sale of drugs, cosmetics, hardware, stationery, dishes and on the premises bakery." Ingannamorte, 55 N.J. at 224-25, 260
A.2d at 841. The uses excluded matched the use excluded in the businesses of other retailers in
the center. For a description of the makeup of the center, see Ingannamorte, 55 N.J. at 224,
260 A.2d at 841.
82. Id. at 229-30, 260 A.2d at 844.
83. Id. at 227, 260 A.2d at 843.
84. 55 N.J. 231, 238, 260 A.2d 845, 849 (1970).
85. Id. at 232-36, 260 A.2d at 846-48 (Lease was for the land adjacent to the truck stop
on which the diner was located. The plaintiff corporation's predecessors had constructed the
diner, sold it, and leased the land for its operation).
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ally closed the diner.86 The lessors remained in operation of the truck
stop.87 The court recognized that the diner and truck stop operations88 were interdependent and therefore implied a covenant of "use
and occupancy." 89
The Pennsylvania Superior Court expressed agreement with the
rationale of Inganamorte and Tooley's in McKnight-Seibert Shopping Center Inc. v. National Tea Co.90 McKnight noted the attractiveness of the interdependence of economic units argument, but the

case before the court involved only a temporary cessation of operation. 91 The court distinguished McKnight from Slater because the
cessation in Slater was permanent. 92 Whether the decision in Slater
extends the rationale of Inganamorte and Tooley's is questionable
because the decision in Slater is largely based on contract princi-

ples. 93 One commentator has noted that the spread of interdependence of economic units doctrine could result in an override of other
considerations when examining the covenants of "large tenants in
'
shopping centers and other group tenant situations. "94
C.

Percentage-BasedRental

A provision in a lease for percentage-based rental is the single
most important factor a court looks for when it considers whether to
imply a covenant to operate.9 It should be noted, however, that this
86. Id. 260 A.2d at 846-47 (diner had passed through several owner-lessees, and when
the case went to trial was closed due to an order of the board of health).
87. Id. at 234-36, 260 A.2d at 847 (plaintiff continued operation of the truck stop and
was incorporated with the former owner and his son as principal stockholders into the plaintiff
corporation).
88. Id. at 237, 260 A.2d at 848. One can only imagine the problems associated with the
lack of coffee at a truck stop.
89. Tooley's Truck Stop, Inc. v. Chrisanthopoulis, 55 N.J. 231, 236-39, 260 A.2d 845,
848 (1970).
90. 263 Pa. Super. 292, 397 A.2d 1214 (1979).
91. Id. at 297-98, 397 A.2d at 1217. (Lessee had closed temporarily in order to facilitate
a transfer of the leased premises. Lessee was in financial difficulty and had acquired another
tenant to take over the lease).
92. Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 376 Pa. Super. 580, 584-86, 546 A.2d 676, 67879 (1988).
93. Id. at 586-90, 546 A.2d at 679-81.
94. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at § 6.904. Although the Pennsylvania Superior Court
has expressed an acceptance of the New Jersey rationale, the rationale of the New Jersey
Supreme Court has not met with full acceptance by other courts. See Walgreen Arizona Drug
v. Plaza Center Corp., 132 Ariz. 512, 516-17, 647 P.2d 643, 647-48 (1982). The Arizona
Court of Appeals held that the New Jersey rationale missed the long-standing precedent that a
"statement as to use of leased premises does not imply a covenant that the lessee may not
cease to use the premises for any purpose." Walgreen, 132 Ariz. at 517, 647 P.2d at 648,
citing Annotation, Tenant's Duty to Operate, 46 A.L.R. 1134 (1927).
95. See Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955); Walgreen Arizona Drug Co. v. Plaza Center Corp., 132 Ariz. 512, 647 P.2d 634 (1982). See also
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is not the only factor that courts will consider. The two New Jersey
cases that recognized a covenant of continuous operation on the basis
of interdependent economic units did not involve percentage-based
rents.96 The percentage-based rental, however, will usually demonstrate some basis for damages to the landlord.9 7 This can be important because it may be difficult, if not impossible, to show that the
landlord is entitled to damages. 8
A lease may provide for a percentage rental that may include a
base or minimum rental. 99 The typical lease includes a base rental
sufficient to cover expenses. The percentage is a bonus to the landlord. 0 0 As discussed above, most mortgage finance companies favor
this leasing arrangement. 10 ' The landlord, however, may not be in a
position to negotiate a base rental that covers all expenses, and will
count on the percentage rental to cover operating expenses.' Courts
have examined the sufficiency of the base rental before implying a
covenant to operate.' 03 One court found that a substantial base
rental replaced a covenant to operate.' 0 1 Although this holding is extreme, it is not contrary to the majority view that considers the minimum rental to be important. The courts generally allow more freeAnnotation, Construction and application of provision in lease under which landlord is to
receive percentage of lessee's profits or receipts, 170 A.L.R. 1117 (1947).
96. Ingannamorte v. King's Super Markets, 55 N.J. 223, 260 A.2d 840 (1970); Tooley's
Truck Stop, Inc. v. Chrisanthopous, 55 N.J. 231, 260 A.2d 845 (1970).
97. See Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 145-47, 280 P.2d 775, 781
(1955), citing Marvin Drug Co. v. Couch, 134 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). See also M.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at § 6.11..
98. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at § 6.11.
99. Percoff v. Sloman, 259 Ala. 482, 67 So. 2d 31 (1953); Stockton Dry Goods Co. v.
Girsh, 36 Cal. 2d 677, 227 P.2d 122 (1951); Masciotra v. Harlow, 105 Cal. App. 2d 376, 233
P.2d 536 (1951); Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer Properties, 150 Fla. 132, 7 So. 2d 312
(1942); Selber Bros. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 194 La. 654, 194 So. 579 (1940).
100. See Faletti, supra note 1, at 162.
The mortgage lender is particularly anxious to find that all fixed charges of
operating the shopping center, such as operating costs, debt service requirements
on the mortgage (which include amortization of principle as well as interest payments), and real estate taxes, are covered by fixed income (exclusive of percentage rents) derived from AAA-l-rated tenants. To the extent that the income
from such tenants (or acceptable regional or local tenants) falls short of covering
those costs, the mortgage terms become more burdensome and onerous until the
point is reached where mortgage financing is not available from the institutional
lender.
101. See id.; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
102. Lippman v. Sears Roebuck Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 140-42, 280 P.2d 775, 778 (1955);
Walgreen Arizona Drug v. Plaza Center Corp., 132 Ariz. 512, 515, 647 P.2d 643, 646 (1982).
In both Lippman and Walgreen the lessors presented evidence that rentals were insufficient,
due to lessee's bargaining position as a major tenant. See also HANDBOOK, supra note I, at 63.
103. See Lippman, 44 Cal. 2d at 145-47, 280 P.2d at 781; Walgreen, 132 Ariz. at 516,
647 P.2d at 647. See also 49 Am. JUR. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 232 (1970).
104. Cousins Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 149, 113 P.2d
878, 882 (1941).
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dom to the lessee in the operation of his business, and allow the
lessee to cease his business if he guarantees a minimum rental. 100
The lease in Slater did not involve a percentage-based rental.' 0
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, however, used the lack of a per-

centage rental to support its decision in McKnight-Seibert Shopping
Center, Inc. v. National Tea Co.'0 7 that a covenant to operate did
not exist. The Pennsylvania courts, therefore, would probably consider a percentage rental situation to be a stronger case for implying
a covenant to operate than the situation presented in the Slater
0 8

case.2

D.

Contract Principles

Courts generally regard leases as contracts. 10 9 Therefore, many
traditional contract principles are applicable to a lease.
1. Leases as Contracts.-An excellent analysis of contract
principles in relation to implied covenants of continuous operation is
made by Justice Edmunds in Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co."'
The California Supreme Court, in Lippman, examined the rules governing implied covenants. The court quoted Cousins Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co.,"' which set forth five rules for implied

covenants:

12

(1) The implication must arise from the language used or it
must be indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties;
(2) it must appear from the language used that it was so clearly
within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it; (3) implied covenants can only be justified on the grounds of legal necessity; (4) a promise can be im105. Percoff v. Soloman, 259 Ala. 482, 67 So. 2d 31 (1953); Stockton Dry Goods Co. v.
Girsh, 36 Cal. 2d 677, 227 P.2d 122 (1951); Masciotra v. Harlow, 105 Cal. App. 2d 376, 233
P.2d 586 (1951); Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer Properties, 150 Fla. 132, 7 So. 2d 342
(1942); Selber Bros. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 194 La. 634, 194 So. 579 (1940). See also
Annotation, Construction and application of provision in lease under which landlord is to

receive percentage of lessee's profits or receipts, 170 A.LR. 1113 (1947).
106. Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 376 Pa. Super. 580, 581-83, 546 A.2d 676,
677-78 (1988).
107. 263 Pa. Super. 292, 297, 397 A.2d 1214, 1217 (1979).
108. See id.
109. See infra notes 110-34 and accompanying text. Pennsylvania courts have long held
that a lease is in the nature of a contract. Cimina v. Bronich, 517 Pa. 378, 537 A.2d 1355
(1988); Amoco Oil Co. v. Snyder, 505 Pa. 214, 478 A.2d 795 (1984); Ezy Parks v. Larson,
499 Pa. 615, 454 A.2d 928 (1982).
110. 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955).
i11. 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 149, 113 P.2d 878, 882 (1941).
112. Lippman, 44 Cal. 2d at 148-51, 280 P.2d at 779 (quoting Cousins Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 149, 113 P.2d 878, 882 (1941)).
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plied only where it can be rightfully assumed that it would have
been made if attention had been called to it; (5) there can be no
implied covenant where the subject is completely covered by the
contract. 13
The Lippman court did not, however, apply each of these criteria to
the case. Instead, the court presumed that the requirements were
satisfied." 4 The court also assessed the percentage rent involved,
which the lessor was attempting to recover. 115
According to the Lippman court, the statement in a lease that
sets forth the purpose for which the premises are to be used does not
imply a covenant for use. 1 6 The court looked to the percentage lease
as implying a promise similar to that which arises in the area of
output contracts. 17 The court cited several cases 1 8 that implied a
covenant to operate in a percentage lease situation and then opined
that these decisions
rest upon a theory of interpretation similar to that employed in
the consideration of "output" contracts, where the courts have

found, "from the business situation, from the conduct of the parties, and from the startling disproportionate burden otherwise
cast upon one of them, a promise implied in fact by the seller to

continue in good faith production or sales, or on the part of the
buyer to maintain his business or plant as a going concern and
to take its bona fide requirements. In other words, this view implies an obligation to carry out the contract in the way anticipated, and not for the purposes of speculation to the injury of
the other party . .

"119

The court concluded that under this approach, the lessee was under
an implied duty of good faith to continue the percentage rental.' In
113. Id.
114. See Lippman, 44 Cal. 2d at 145-47, 280 P.2d at 779-81.
115.

Lippman v. Sears Roebuck Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 145-47, 280 P.2d 775, 779-81

(1955). Sears used the leased premises only for storage during the last year of the term. The
lessor sought to recover percentage rentals above the minimum rental, which he would have
received had Sears continued in operation. The term of the lease had expired and Sears was
not occupying the premises. Lippman, 44 Cal. 2d at 144-45, 280 P.2d at 778.
116. See Lippman, 44 Cal. 2d at 142-43, 280 P.2d at 779, citing 46 A.L.R. 1134 (1926).
See also infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text. (This is the proposition that Dickey v.
Philadelphia Minit Man Corp., 377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580 (1954), stands for in
Pennsylvania).
117. Lippman, 44 Cal. 2d at 142-43, 280 P.2d at 779. An output contract is a contract
in which one party agrees to sell his entire output and the other agrees to buy it. BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY 293 (5th ed. 1979).

118. Id. at 142-43, 280 P.2d at 779.
119. Id. (quoting I S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 104A (Rev. ed. 1936)).
120. Lippman v. Sears Roebuck Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 142-43, 280 P.2d 775, 779 (1955).
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acknowledging this duty, the court noted that the minimum rental
involved was the factor that would determine the outcome of the
case.1" The intent of the parties with regard to the minimum rental,
and the general negotiations, showed that the lessor had accepted an
insufficient minimum rental and had gambled on the tenant's success.122 Thus, the court inferred an implied covenant to operate.
The Lippman court's approach was adopted by the Arizona
Court of Appeals in Walgreen Arizona Drug v. Plaza Center
Corp."' 8 In Walgreen the court rejected the New Jersey interdepen24
dent economic units rationale in favor of the Lippman rationale.1
The decision by the Arizona court represents a logical position
regarding the interpretation of leases. The facts in Walgreen are
similar to those of Ingannamorte,one of the New Jersey cases. Both
cases involved various transfers of a leasehold in a shopping center
and the eventual closing of a key tenant's operation.126 The interdependence of economic units was at least as strong in Walgreen as in
Ingannamorte.The Walgreen decision appears to be an outright rejection of the New Jersey rationale. In Walgreen, the court, after
mentioning the factors laid down in Lippman v. Sears Roebuck, examined an additional contract principle: "It is not enough to say that
it is necessary to make the contract fair, that it ought to have contained a stipulation which is not found in it, or that without such
covenant it would be improvident, unwise or operate unjustly.' 126
The principle appears to explain the reason for rejecting the interdependence of economic units rationale adopted by New Jersey courts.
The Walgreen court placed a strong emphasis on the lack of a
percentage rental in the pertinent leases. The landlord argued that
he agreed to the insufficient fixed rental "based upon an implied
promise by Globe City [lessee] to maintain continuous operation so
as to draw customers to the center who would profitably support the
121. Id.
122. Id. at 145-47, 280 P.2d at 781.
123. 132 Ariz. 512, 647 P.2d 643 (1982).
124. Id. at 513-15, 647 P.2d at 646-48.
125. See id. at 513-15, 647 P.2d at 644-46; Ingannamorte v. King's Supermarkets, 55
N.J. 223, 223-26, 260 A.2d 841, 841-42 (1970). The Walgreen facts involved the closing of a
discount store that was the major tenant. See Walgreen, 132 Ariz. at 515, 647 P.2d at 646.
The Ingannamorte facts involved the closing of a supermarket that made up a third of the
shopping center. See Ingannamorte, 55 N.J. at 224, 260 A.2d at 841. Both of these types of
stores would be considered key tenants, and the closing of either would be extremely detrimental to the success of the center. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 63.
126. Walgreen, 132 Ariz. at 515-16, 647 P.2d at 646-47 (quoting Smith v. Phlegar, 73
Ariz. 11, 18, 236 P.2d 749, 754 (1951)).
127. See Walgreen, 132 Ariz. at 516, 647 P.2d at 647.
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other "satellite" businesses at the center." 128 The court rejected this

argument, stating that "a fixed base rental, in absence of a rental
based upon sales, in and of itself, gives rise to no implication that the
lessee shall continue to operate a business upon the premises." 129 The

court found that an insufficient fixed rental implies nothing, but that
a percentage rental implies a covenant to operate.'30 The adequacy
or inadequacy of base rent becomes a factor only when the rental is
based on percentage of sales.181 This interpretation may leave some
landlords without a remedy when a tenant has the bargaining position to get out of both percentage rental and sufficient minimum
rental.'8 2 The court therefore dismissed a potentially valid claim of
an implied covenant of continuous operation, which it should have
allowed the lessor to prove. It seems possible that the lessor could
have shown that the low fixed monthly rental' 83 was the result of an
implied covenant of continuous operation. The court's emphasis on
the percentage rental, however, was not inappropriate because the
percentage rental is the single most important consideration in implying a covenant of continuous operation. 34
The Doctrine of Necessary Implication.-The Pennsylvania

2.

Superior Court in Slater applied the doctrine of necessary implication to the lease at issue.' 38 The doctrine appears to have existed in
Pennsylvania for many years prior to the Slater decision.", The doc-

trine did 87not, however, acquire its name until the Slater case was
decided.

1

128. Walgreen Arizona Drug v. Plaza Center Corp., 132 Ariz. 512, 515, 647 P.2d 643,
646 (1982).
129. Id. at 516, 647 P.2d at 647.

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See supra note 31-36 and accompanying text. See also Walgreen, 132 Ariz. at 515,
647 P.2d at 646.
133. See Walgreen Arizona Drug v. Plaza Center Corp., 132 Ariz. 512, 515, 647 P.2d
643, 646 (1982). The fixed monthly rental paid by the lessee was so low that the lessee was
left with a "negative cash flow of over $30,000 per year."
134. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
135. Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 316 Pa. Super. 580, 586-88, 546 A.2d 676,
679-80 (1988). See also supra text accompanying notes 51-52 (language of the doctrine of
necessary implication as stated in Slater).
136. See, MacDonald v. Winfield Corp., 93 F. Supp. 153, 157 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (quoting
12 AM. JUR. Contracts § 239; 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 328); Daniel B. Van Campen Corp. v.
Building and Const. Trades Council, 202 Pa. Super. 118, 122, 195 A.2d 134, 136-37 (1963)
(citation omitted); Frickert v. Deiter Bros. Fuel Co., 464 Pa. 596, 603, 347 A.2d 701, 705
(1975) (Pomeroy, J., concurring) (quoting Daniel B. Van Campen).
137. See 28 WORDS AND PHRASES 281 (1955 & Supp. 1990) (First and only entry under
"Doctrine of Necessary Implication" is to the Slater decision). It should be noted, however,
that the phrase "Doctrine of Necessary Implication" appeared previously in the concurring
opinion of Justice Pomeroy in Frickert, 464 Pa. 596, 603, 347 A.2d 701, 705 (Pomeroy, J.,
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The language of the doctrine of necessary implication appeared
as early as 1950, in a federal case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 3 8 The language was first used by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court in Daniel B. Van Campen Corp. v. Building & Construction
Trades Council.3 9 Although this case did not address leases, the
doctrine gained recognition." 0
The language of the doctrine was repeated in Justice Pomeroy's
concurring opinion in Frickert v. Deiter Brothers Fuel Co."1 Justice
Pomeroy disagreed with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's finding
that the contract in dispute was ambiguous." 2 Although Justice
Pomeroy agreed with the judgment of the case, he did not believe
that the contract had to be ambiguous before the court could effectuate the parties' intentions." 3 Justice Pomeroy summarized his position on the requirement of ambiguity by stating that "the manifest
intentions of the parties are clear: they intended to create an equal
right of purchase among the three 'key employees.' If the parties'
intentions are clear, I fail to see how the contract may be referred to
as 'ambiguous.' -14
The majority in the Frickert case nevertheless did find that the
contract was ambiguous. The majority relied upon ambiguity to imply the meaning of the contract.'" Justice Pomeroy stated that the
approach used by the majority was unnecessary because, according
to him, there was no ambiguity in the contract." 6 Justice Pomeroy
believed the proper approach to correct the parties' failure to resolve
the situation was to apply the "doctrine of necessary implication" to
the contract." 7
The decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Slater
strongly emphasized the concurring opinion of Justice Pomeroy in
Frickert." The Slater court reiterated Justice Pomeroy's opinion to
support the proposition that a court could imply terms of the contract without finding any ambiguity in the language of the conconcurring). See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
138. MacDonald v. Winfield, 93 F. Supp. 153, 157 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
139. 202 Pa. Super. 118, 122, 195 A.2d 134, 136-37 (1963).
140. Id. at 119-22, 195 A.2d at 134-37.
141. 464 Pa. 596, 603, 347 A.2d 701, 705 (1975) (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 602-03, 347 A.2d at 705.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 600-02, 347 A.2d at 704-05.
146. Frickert v. Deiter Bros. Fuel Co., 464 Pa. 596, 602-03, 347 A.2d 701, 705 (1975)
(Pomeroy, J., concurring).
147. Id.
148. See Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 376 Pa. Super. 580, 586-87, 546 A.2d 676,
679 (1988).
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tract. " 9 The Slater court stated:
Since the doctrine of necessary implication serves not to instruct
the court as to which of two possible interpretations of a con-

tract should be adopted, but rather to allow the court to enforce
the clear intentions of the parties and avoid injustice, the court
does not need to find an ambiguity before it will employ the
doctrine. 50

The doctrine as employed by the Slater court bears similarity to the
rationale employed by the court in Lippman.' 5' The Lippman test
and the doctrine of necessary implication do not require ambiguity
to be used by the court. The court need not look for ambiguity in the
contract because the intent of the parties is the important factor. 52
The doctrine of necessary implication as used by the Slater
court is consistent with other rules of contract interpretation and
construction. Implied terms in a contract carry as much force as express terms. " ' The implied terms either must arise from the language of the contract, or must be "indispensable to effectuate the
parties' intention."' 4 The doctrine of necessary implication is
designed to carry out the intent of the parties at the time they made
the contract. 55
Contract rules of construction and interpretation consist of primary and secondary rules. 56 The primary rules determine the meaning of terms within the contract. These rules require interpretation
of the contract as a whole in light of the surrounding circumstances.' The rules, however, are designed to effectuate the intent
of the parties. 158 Secondary rules allow the court to carry out the
main purpose of the contract, and are termed the "main purpose
doctrine."''8 This doctrine allows a court to fulfill the purpose of the
60
contract when the contract does not contain proper provisions.1
Thus, the doctrine of necessary implication provides protection for
149. Id.
150. Slater, 376 Pa. Super. at 587, 546 A.2d at 679.
151. Compare id. at 585-87, 546 A.2d at 679 with Lippman v. Sears Roebuck Co., 44
Cal. 2d 136, 142-43, 280 P.2d 775, 779 (1955).
152. See Slater, 376 Pa. Super. at 585-87, 546 A.2d at 679.
153. Siegal v. Lauer, 148 Pa. 236, 23 A. 996 (1882). See also 6 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 887 (3d ed. 1962).
154. 8 P.L.E., Contracts § 164 (1971).
155. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
156. 4 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, §§ 618-19 (3d ed. 1961).
157. Id. at § 618.
158. Id.
159. Id. at § 619.
160. Id.
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the rights and expectation of the parties.
IV.

Possible Remedies for Landlord

The Slater decision did not discuss the possible remedies available for the breach of a covenant of continuous operation. 61 The
plaintiff in Slater appealed the lower court's decision to grant defendant's preliminary objection in the form of a demurrer. 1' 2 The
superior court reversed and remanded the trial court's decision for
further consideration and gave no guidance for an appropriate
remedy."'
Case law in other jurisdictions suggests several possible remedies that could be applied by the Pennsylvania courts. The New
Jersey Supreme Court in Ingannamorte'" and Tooley's'" gave the
defendant an opportunity to resume operations or to vacate the
leased premises. 1" The approach adopted by the New Jersey court
restored the landlord to the position he was in before he leased the
property to the nonoccupying lessor. There are several advantages to
this approach. First, the landlord may recover his nonoccupying tenant, thereby allowing him to maintain his planned tenant mix. 67
Second, because the landlord could avoid having to assess complex
monetary damages, the court may be more willing to imply a covenant to use and occupy. The plaintiff lessors in both Ingannamorte
and Tooley's had requested this remedy, 68 which the courts approved. 69 Because the Pennsylvania Superior Court used the Ingannamorte case to support its decision in Slater, it may be inferred
that the court tacitly approved of the remedy used by the New
Jersey Court.'7 0
The remedy provided by the New Jersey Supreme 'Court may
not compensate the landlord for all of his damages. The remedy appears to be a concession on the part of the lessors in order to acquire
161. Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 376 Pa. Super. 580, 589-90, 546 A.2d 676, 681
(1988).
162. Id. at 582, 546 A.2d at 677.
163. Id. at 589-90, 546 A.2d at 681.
164. Ingannamorte v. King's Super Markets, 55 N.J. 223, 260 A.2d 841 (1970).
165. Tooley's Truck Stop, Inc., v. Chrisanthopouls, 55 N.J. 231, 260 A.2d 845 (1970).
166. Ingannamorte, 55 N.J. at 230-31, 260 A.2d at 845; Tooley's, 55 N.J. at 238-39,
260 A.2d at 849. In both cases thirty days were allowed for the resumption of operations.
167. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
168. Ingannomorte, 55 N.J. at 230-31, 260 A.2d at 845; Tooley's, 55 N.J. at 238-39,
260 A.2d at 849.
169. Ingannamorte v. King's Super Markets, 55 N.J. 223, 230-31, 260 A.2d 841, 845;
Tooley's, 55 N.J. at 238-39, 260 A.2d at 849.
170. Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 376 Pa. Super. 580, 587-90, 546 A.2d 676,
680-81 (1988).
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the most favorable result possible.171 It also improves the lessors'
chances of obtaining at least partial relief.
The economic effect of a tenant's failure to operate in a shopping center is difficult to measure. 172 In a lease providing for a percentage rental, the loss of the percentage rental due to a lessee's
closing may be one possible measure of damages.17 a Recovery of
these damages, however, does not compensate for the loss of other
percentage rentals in the center caused by the detrimental effect of
the nonoperating lessee.' 7' It is difficult if not impossible to determine damages from the loss of percentage rentals of other tenants.
The California Supreme Court, in Lippman,17 5 suggested that
the proper damages are the amount of the percentage rental the lessor would have received if the defendant had continued in operation.176 The Lippman decision, 'however, does not suggest any
77
method for making a determination of the amount of such rental.1
It may be possible to determine the loss by looking to a prior year's
rent or to the lessee's other operation. 17 8 It is questionable whether a
reliable and accurate determination is possible in light of varied economic forces that may have affected the lessee's business.' 79
The difficulty of determining the landlord's damages at law may
make the use of specific performance an attractive remedy. Courts
may, however, be reluctant to grant specific performance by a retail
store because of the difficulty in enforcing the remedy.' 0
In Dover Shopping Center, Inc. v. Cushman Sons, Inc.,'' the
New Jersey Superior Court granted specific performance for the operation of a retail bakery outlet in a shopping center.' 2 The court
limited the scope of its decree and required the lessee "[to] reopen
and resume its retail bakery business, to display its name
171. See Tooley's Truck Stop, Inc. v. Christanthopouls, 55 N.J. 231, 238-39, 260 A.2d
845, 849 (1970).
172. See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at § 6.11.
173. Lippman v. Sears Roebuck Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 142-43, 280 P.2d 775, 781 (1955).
See also M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at § 6.11.
174. See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at § 6.11. See also supra note 30 and accompanying text (Discussing the importance of tenant mix and cooperative effort to the center's
success. The loss of this mix is important here in that it will likely result in a less successful, if
not failing, center and therefore a loss of rental to the landlord.).
175. Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955).
176. Id. at 142-43, 280 P.2d at 781.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Note, supra note 29, at 553-57.
181. 63 N.J. Super. 384, 164 A.2d 785 (1960).
182. Id. at 393-95, 164 A.2d at 791.
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'Cushman's' on the outside of the premises, to keep the store as required by paragraph third of the lease, and to maintain a salesperson
1'88
or manager in charge."
The remedies appropriate for a lessor will vary according to the
situation involved. In a case such as Slater, in which the lessor wants
the court to imply a covenant to use and occupy, the court may be
more receptive to the lessor's position if the remedy is manageable
and easily granted. A plaintiff requesting a grant of specific performance will have to address the problem of judicial supervision. 1"" The
lessor may wish to limit the request to specific acts, as in the Dover
case.1" 5 Limiting court supervision will help to remove the traditional
problems associated with specific performance.1 86
A request for money damages will be difficult to support1 87 because determination of money damages will be difficult and probably
inaccurate. The inadequacy of money damages may support an argument for specific performance."8 The lessor may want to make a
concession and may request an order to vacate or reopen, as the
plaintiffs did in Ingannamorte and Tooley's. Such an order could
place the lessor in a satisfactory position and allow the landlord to
relet the premises to a new tenant or allow the tenant to resume his
old operation. This remedy will be an attractive means of disposing
of the case, thereby facilitating a favorable result for the lessor. The
formulation of a remedy that is attractive to the court may make the
court more willing to imply a covenant of use and occupancy.
V.

Conclusion

The decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Slater v.
Pearle Vision Center, Inc. represents a proper expansion of the law
with regard to the construction and interpretation of leases. Allowing
the courts to imply a covenant to operate acknowledges the realities
of the interdependent economic situation in a shopping mall. Implied
covenants to operate are especially appropriate if one party to the
lease had disproportionate power in determining the terms of the
lease.
The doctrine of necessary implication adopted by the court in
183. Id. at 391-95, 164 A.2d at 790-91.
184. See Note, supra note 29, at 553-57.
185. See Dover, 63 N.J. Super. at 391-95, 164 A.2d at 790-91.
186. See Dover Shopping Center, Inc. v. Cushman Sons, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 384, 39195, 164 A.2d 785, 790-91 (1960). See also Note, supra note 30, at 553-57.
187. See Note, supra note 29, at 553-57.
188. See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
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Slater is intended to effectuate the parties' intent. This is the best
reason to imply a covenant to use and occupy. Finding a covenant
solely based upon the interdependence of economic units ignores the
freedom of parties to enter into a bargain. A determination of the
parties' intentions is the proper means of implying any term in a
contract, including a covenant to use and occupy.
The discovery of appropriate remedies may allow the continued
expansion of implied covenants to use and occupy in Pennsylvania.
The lessor faced with litigation should consider carefully the solution
he would like to achieve and should request an appropriate remedy.
In fashioning this remedy, the lessor should bear in mind that a
court will be more willing to provide a reasonable remedy that is
easily determinable and enforceable.
Slater places lessors in an uncertain position as to the interpretation of leases. The courts now have precedent to support implying
a covenant to operate. Whether a court will make such an implication is a question that invites litigation. Similarly, Slater leaves tenants unsure of their duties in regard to occupancy. Slater expounds
the role of the court in interpreting leases, and by so doing, clouds
the duties of the parties to the lease. The parties are subject to judicial determinations of their duties.
The best precaution for a lessor is to insert an express covenant
to operate in the lease. The clause in the lease in Dover is a good
example of an express covenant to operate.18 9 A court will be willing
to enforce a well-drafted and detailed clause. 9 A further precaution
a lessor may wish to take is to add a background clause to the lease.
A clause describing the circumstances surrounding the lease and the
intentions of the parties will assist a court in determining the purpose of the lease. The court will then be able to imply covenants
consistent with the achievement of that purpose.
James P. DeAngelo

189.
190.

See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See supra note 60.

